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Data privacy when using online systems like Facebook and
Amazon has become an increasingly popular topic in the
last few years. However, only a little is known about how
users and developers perceive privacy and which concrete
measures would mitigate privacy concerns. To investigate
privacy requirements, we conducted an online survey with
closed and open questions and collected 408 valid responses.
Our results show that users often reduce privacy to security,
with data sharing and data breaches being their biggest con-
cerns. Users are more concerned about the content of their
documents and personal data such as location than their in-
teraction data. Unlike users, developers clearly prefer tech-
nical measures like data anonymization and think that pri-
vacy laws and policies are less effective. We also observed
interesting differences between people from different geogra-
phies. For example, people from Europe are more concerned
about data breaches than people from North America. Peo-
ple from Asia/Pacific and Europe believe that content and
metadata are more critical for privacy than people from
North America. Our results contribute to developing a user-
driven privacy framework that is based on empirical evidence
in addition to the legal, technical, and commercial perspec-
tives.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.1 [Software Engineering]: Requirements/Specifica-





Human factors in software engineering, requirements en-
gineering, privacy, user developer collaboration, empirical
studies
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1. INTRODUCTION
As systems that collect and use personal data, such as
Facebook and Amazon, become more pervasive in our daily
lives, users are starting to worry about their privacy. There
has been a lot of media and press coverage about data pri-
vacy. One of the earliest articles in the New York Times
reported how it was possible to break the anonymity of
AOL’s search engine’s users [7]. A more recent article men-
tions privacy concerns about Google Glass [25]. Both tech-
nical and, especially, non-technical users are finding it in-
creasingly hard to navigate this privacy minefield [20]. This
is further exacerbated by well-known systems periodically
making changes that breach privacy and not allowing users
to opt out a-priori [18].
There is a large body of research on privacy in various
research communities. This ranges from novel techniques
to make privacy settings more understandable [17, 27] to
data anonymization techniques for privacy in different do-
mains [12, 22, 28, 36]. Recent studies have shown that there
is a discrepancy between users’ intentions and reality for pri-
vacy settings [23, 24]. The assumption behind most of this
work is that privacy is well-specified and important. How-
ever, there is very little evidence about what exactly are the
user concerns, priorities, and trade-offs, and how users think
these concerns can be mitigated. In particular, in the soft-
ware engineering community, there have been no systematic
studies to find out what the privacy requirements are for
users and how these requirements should be addressed by
developers.
This paper aims to understand the privacy expectations
and needs for modern software systems. To this end, we
conducted a study using an online survey. We received 595
responses and selected 408 of them as valid. The responses
included diverse populations including developers and users,
and people from North America, Europe, and Asia. The
results of our study show that the biggest privacy concerns
are data sharing and data breaches. On the other hand,
there is disagreement on the best approach to address these
concerns. With respect to types of data that are critical
for privacy, people are least concerned about metadata and
most concerned about their personal data and the content
of documents. Most people are not willing to accept less
privacy in exchange for fewer advertisements and financial
incentives such as discounts on purchases.
The main contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it
illustrates and quantifies the general trends on how people
understand privacy and on how they assess different privacy
concerns and techniques to address them. Second, the paper
identifies differences in privacy expectations between various
groups: developers and users, on one hand, and people from
different geographic regions, on the other hand. Finally,
the paper gives insights into how software developers and
managers can address privacy concerns of their users.
Our analysis for geographic regions, for example, shows
that there is a significant difference between respondents
from North America, Europe, and Asia/Pacific. People from
Europe and Asia/Pacific rate different types of data such as
metadata, content, and interaction being a lot more critical
for privacy than respondents from North America. People
from Europe are a lot more concerned about data breaches
than data sharing whereas people from North America are
equally concerned about the two. Similarly, our analysis for
developers versus users shows a marked difference between
the two groups. For example, developers believe that pri-
vacy laws and policies are less effective for reducing privacy
concerns than data anonymization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the design of our study. Sections 3–5 highlight
its key results. Section 6 discusses the implications of the
results and limitations of the study. We describe related
work in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
2. STUDY DESIGN
We describe the research questions, methods, and respon-
dents of our study.
2.1 Research Questions
The goal of this study is to gather and analyze privacy
requirements for modern software systems. In particular, we
want to study the perception of different groups of people
on privacy. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary,
privacy is the “freedom from unauthorized intrusion.” We
are interested specifically in data privacy and other notions
of privacy such as physical privacy are beyond the scope of
our work.
We focused on the following research questions:
• RQ 1: What are developers’ and users’ perceptions of
privacy? What aspects of privacy are more important
and what are the best techniques to address them?
(Section 3)
• RQ 2: Does software development experience have
any impact on privacy requirements? (Section 4)
• RQ 3: Does geography have any impact on privacy
requirements? (Section 5)
By perception, we mean the subjective understanding and
assessment of privacy aspects. Since privacy is a very broad
term, we are interested in specific aspects such as types of
concerns, techniques to mitigate these concerns, types of
data that are critical to privacy, and whether people would
give up privacy. We focus on these aspects because we think
they are most related to software engineering topics.
2.2 Research Method
We created an online survey that consisted of 16 ques-
tions. Out of these, 14 questions were closed and respon-
dents had to choose an answer from a given list of options.
These questions consisted of 3-point and 5-point semantic
scale questions. These types of questions allow for the mea-
surement of subjective assessments of people while allowing
for some flexibility of the interpretation [30]. For example,
one of the questions was: “Would users be willing to use
your system if they are worried about privacy issues?” and
the answer options were: “Definitely yes - Users don’t care
about privacy,” “Probably yes,” “Unsure,” “Probably not,”
and “Definitely not - if there are privacy concerns, users will
not use this system.” We used the 3-point scale for the ma-
jority of the questions as we did not need respondents to
have higher discriminative powers as needed by the 5-point
scale. Jacoby and Matell [21] have shown that 3-point scales
do not result in any significant reduction in reliability or va-
lidity.
We chose a survey instead of direct observation or in-
terviews because of the following reasons: First, a survey
is very scalable and allowed us to get a large number and
broad cross-section of responses. Second, we were interested
in the subjective opinion of people and this can be different
from real behavior. Third, the closed questions were purely
quantitative and allowed us to analyze general trends for
our survey respondents. In addition, the survey also had
two open-ended questions. This helped us get qualitative
insights about privacy and gave an opportunity for respon-
dents to report aspects that were not already included in
the closed questions.
Respondents could choose to fill out our survey in two
languages: English or German. For each language, there
were two slightly different versions based on whether the
respondents had experience in software development or not.
The difference in the versions was only in the phrasing of
the questions in order to reduce confusion. For example,
developers were asked: “Would users be willing to use your
system if they are worried about privacy issues?” whereas
users were asked: “Would you be willing to use the system if
you are worried about privacy issues?” In total, the survey
took 5-10 minutes to answer.
To increase the reliability of the study [30], we took the
following measures:
• Pilot Testing: We conducted pilot testing of our sur-
vey in four iterations with a total of ten users that
focused on improving the timing and understandabil-
ity of the questions. We wanted to reduce ambiguity
about the questions and answers and ensure that none
of the semantics were lost in translation. We used the
feedback from pilot testing to improve the phrasing
and the order of questions for both the English and
German versions.
• Random order of answers: The answer options for the
closed questions were randomly ordered. This ensures
that answer order does not influence the response [38].
• Validation questions: To ensure that respondents did
not fill out the answers arbitrarily, we included two
validation questions [3]. For example, one of the vali-
dation questions was: “What is the sum of 2 and 5?”
Respondents who did not answer these correctly were
not included in the final set of valid responses.
• Post sampling: We monitored the number of respon-
dents from each category of interest: developers versus
users and geographic location. We conducted post-
sampling and stratification to ensure that we got suf-
ficient responses for each category and that the ratio
Developers Users
North America 85 44
Europe 116 65
Asia 61 30
South America 3 2
Africa 2 0
Table 1: Summary of study respondents based on
location and software development experience
of developers to users for each geographic location was
roughly similar. For categories that did not have suf-
ficient respondents, we targeted those populations by
posting the survey in specific channels. We stopped
data collection when we had a broad spectrum of re-
spondents and sufficient representation in all the cat-
egories of interest.
Finally, to corroborate our results and analysis of data,
we conducted a number of statistical tests. In particular, we
used the Z-test for equality of proportions [32] and Welch’s
Two Sample t-test to check if our results are statistically
significant.
2.3 Survey Respondents
We did not have any restrictions on who could fill out
the survey. We wanted, in particular, people with and with-
out software development experience and people from differ-
ent parts of the world. We distributed our survey through
a variety of channels including various mailing lists, social
networks like Facebook and Twitter, and personal and pro-
fessional colleagues. We circulated the survey across compa-
nies with which we are collaborating. We also asked specific
people with many contacts (e.g., with many followers on
Twitter) to forward the survey. As an incentive, two iPads
would be raffled among the survey respondents.
In total, 595 respondents filled out our survey between
10 November 2012 and 8 September 2013. Filtering out
the incomplete and invalid responses resulted in 408 valid
responses (68.6% completion rate). Table 1 shows the re-
spondents based on location and software development ex-
perience. The four versions of the survey along with raw
data and summary information are available on our web-
site1. Among the respondents, 267 have software develop-
ment experience and 141 do not. For respondents with soft-
ware development experience, 28 have less than one year
of experience, 129 have 1-5 years of experience, 57 have 5-
10 years of experience, and 53 have more than ten years of
experience. 129 respondents live in North America, 181 in
Europe, and 91 in Asia/Pacific. 166 are affiliated with indus-
try and the public sector, 182 are in academia and research,
and 56 are students.
3. PRIVACY PERCEPTIONS
We asked respondents: “How important is the privacy is-
sue in online systems?” They answered using a 5-point se-
mantic scale ranging from “Very important” to “Least im-
portant.” 66.7% of the respondents chose “Very Important,”
25.3% chose “Important,” and the remaining three options
1http://www.psl.cs.columbia.edu/1476/privacy-
requirements/
(“Average,”“Less Important,”“Least Important”) combined
were chosen by a total of 8.1% of the respondents.
The location of the data storage was a key concern for the
respondents. We asked respondents whether privacy con-
cerns depend on the location of where the data is stored
and provided a 5-point semantic scale with options: “Yes,”
“Maybe yes,” “Unsure,” “Maybe not,” “No.” 57.7% of the
respondents chose “Yes” and 28.6% chose “Maybe yes” while
the remaining three options were chosen by a total of 13.7%
of the respondents.
On the other hand, there was disagreement about whether
users would be willing to use such systems if there were pri-
vacy concerns.. The answer options were: “Definitely yes -
Users don’t care about privacy,” “Probably yes,” “Unsure,”
“Probably not,” and “Definitely not - if there are privacy
concerns, users will not use this system.” 20.8% of the re-
spondents choose “Unsure,” while 34.8% and 29.4% chose
“Probably yes” and “Probably not” respectively.
3.1 What factors would increase and reduce
privacy concerns?
We asked respondents if the following factors would in-
crease privacy concerns:
• Data Aggregation: The system discovers additional in-
formation about the user by aggregating data over a
long period of time.
• Data Distortion: The system might misrepresent the
data or user intent.
• Data Sharing: The collected data might be given to
third parties for purposes like advertising.
• Data Breaches: Malicious users might get access to
sensitive data about other users.
For each concern, the respondents could answer using a
3-point semantic scale having options: “Yes,” “Uncertain,”
and “No.” We also asked respondents if the following would
help to reduce concerns about privacy:
• Privacy Policy, License Agreements, etc.: Describing
what the system will/won’t do with the data.
• Privacy Laws: Describing which national law the sys-
tem is complaint with (e.g., HIPAA in the US, Euro-
pean privacy laws).
• Anonymizing all data: Ensuring that none of the data
has any personal identifiers.
• Technical Details: Describing the algorithms/source
code of the system in order to achieve higher trust
(e.g., encryption of data).
• Details on usage: Describe, e.g., in a table how differ-
ent data are used.
The overall answers of the respondents for both questions
are shown in Figure 1. In the figure, each answer option is
sorted by the number of “Yes” respondents.
Most respondents agreed that the biggest privacy concerns
are data breaches and data sharing. There is disagreement
about whether data distortion and data aggregation would
cause privacy concerns. To check if these results are statis-
tically significant, we ran Z-tests for equality of proportions.
This would help us validate, for example, if there is a sta-
tistically significant difference in the number of respondents
who said “Yes” for two different options. The results for in-
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Figure 1: What increases and reduces privacy concerns?
p-values
Sharing > Aggregation p = 1.231e−12
Sharing > Distortion p = 6.036e−14
Breach > Aggregation p < 2.2e−16
Breach > Distortion p < 2.2e−16
Table 2: What increases privacy concerns? For each
privacy concern, X > Y indicates that X is a bigger
concern than Y for the respondents. (We used the Z-
test for equality of proportions and only statistically
significant results for p < 0.01 are shown.)
all of these tests, the null hypothesis is that a similar frac-
tion of the respondents chose “Yes” for both options. Our
results show that the concerns about data breaches and data
sharing are statistically significantly higher than data aggre-
gation and data distortion (p ≤ 1.231e−12).
Hypothesis 1: People are more concerned about the se-
curity aspects of privacy and in particular, data sharing and
data breaches than data distortion and data aggregation.
As far as reducing concerns, respondents consider tech-
nical details the least effective option. It is statistically
significantly the worst option (with p-values ranging from
7.218e−10 for comparing to policy to 2.2e−16 for comparing
to anonymization). Respondents think that anonymization
is the most effective option for mitigating privacy concerns
and statistically significantly better than privacy laws (p =
0.003) and privacy policy (p = 0.002). There is, however,
no statistically significant difference between anonymization
and providing usage details (p > 0.15). The remaining three
options (privacy policy, privacy laws, and usage details) had
similar responses and none of their combinations for the Z-
test yielded statistically significant results for p < 0.01.
Hypothesis 2: Different people assess the importance of
various privacy mitigation measures differently.
3.2 Qualitative feedback
Overall, we collected 135 comments from 408 respondents
on our open questions. We analyzed these comments man-
ually in three steps. First, we read each comment and an-
notated it with a few summarizing keywords. Thereby, we
tried to reuse the keywords whenever possible. Second, we
unified and grouped the keywords into topics, making sure
that no important comments are lost. Finally, we read the
comments again and assigned each of them to one of the
identified concerns:
3.2.1 Additional Privacy Concerns
With respect to additional privacy concerns, we collected
66 comments. 15 comments were useless as they just re-
peated the standard response options, were not understand-
able, or without content (e.g., “no comment,” or “nothing
more”). The remaining 51 comments gave interesting in-
sights, which can be grouped into the following topics:
Authorities and intelligent services: 13 respondents
mentioned authorities and intelligent services as an addi-
tional privacy concern. One wrote: “Government access is
not exactly a data breach, but still a privacy concern.” An-
other commented: “anyway there is prism.” It is important
to mention that about half of the responses were collected
after the NSA PRISM scandal [13,15].
APIs, program correctness, and viruses: Nine respon-
dents mentioned concerns related to the program behavior,
including malicious programs and viruses. Respondents also
mentioned that privacy concerns are “transmitted” through
the application programming interfaces of the tools collect-
ing data. One respondent wrote: “Sharing data over API”
while others mentioned specific systems such as Google Ana-
lytics or Facebook API. Three respondents specifically pointed
the correctness of privacy implementation as a specific pri-
vacy concern.
Unusable and nontransparent policies: Seven users
complained about unusable privacy implementations with
unclear, nontransparent policies. These respondents were
concerned because most users simply do not know which
data is being collected about them and for what purposes.
One respondent wrote: “Companies and software develop-
ers shield themselves [. . . ] by making consumers agree on
a long, convoluted, and often a hard to understand hard to
read [. . . ] policy. Companies know that people do not read
them a tactic on which they are banking.” Another gave a
more concrete example: “Sometimes sharing sensitive data
is activated by default in applications (unaware users would
leave it so).” One respondent wrote: “Transparency and let-
ting the user choose make a huge difference. Maybe not in
the beginning and maybe not for all users but definitely for
a specific user group.”
Intentional or unintentional misuse: At least seven re-
spondents mentioned different forms of misusing the data
as main concerns. This includes commercial misuse such as
making products of interest more expensive, but it could
also be misused for social and political purposes. Apart
from abusing the data to put pressure on users, respondents
mentioned using fake data to manipulate public opinions
or inferencing sensitive information about groups of people
and minorities. One respondent wrote: “Whenever some-
thing happen the media uses their data accessible online to
‘sell’ this person as good or evil.”
Lack of control: Seven respondents mentioned the lack of
control and in particular, options to delete data collected
about them as their main concern. One wrote: “if we agree
to give the data, we are not able anymore to revise this
decision and delete the data. Even if the service confirms
the deletion, we don’t have any mean of control.” Another
respondent explicitly mentioned the case where companies
owning their data are bankrupt or sold and in this case, the
privacy of their data is also lost. “Company A has a decent
privacy policy, Company B acquires the company, and in
doing so, now has access to Company A’s data.”
Combined data sources: Five respondents explicitly men-
tioned combining data about users from different sources as
a main privacy concern. In most cases, this cannot be antici-
pated when developing or using a single system or a services.
One respondent wrote: “it’s difficult to anticipate or assess
the privacy risk in this case.” Another claimed: “contin-
uous monitoring, combined with aggregation over multiple
channels or sources, leads to complex user profiling and it’s
disturbing to know that your life is monitored on so many
levels.”
Collecting and storing data: Five respondents wrote
that collecting and storing data is, on its own, a privacy
concern. In particular, respondents complained about too
much data being collected about them and stored for too
long time. One respondent mentioned: “the sheer amount
of cookies that are placed on my computer just by landing
on their website.” Another claimed: “collecting the data and
storing for a long period of time is seen more critical than
just collecting.”
Other issues: Three respondents mentioned problems with
the legal framework and in particular, the compatibility of
laws in the developer and user countries. Three respondents
said that in some cases there is no real option to not use a
system or service, e.g., due to a “social pressure as all use
Facebook” or since “we depend on technology.”
3.2.2 Suggestions for Reducing Privacy Concerns
In total, 69 respondents answered the open question on
additional measures to reduce user concerns about privacy.
Ten of these answers either repeated the standard options or
were useless. The remaining 59 comments showed more con-
vergence in the opinion than the comments on the additional
concerns, possibly because this question was more concrete.
The suggestions can be grouped into the following measures:
Easy and fine-grained control over the data, includ-
ing access and deletion: 17 respondents recommended al-
lowing the users to easily access and control the collected and
processed data about them. In particular, respondents men-
tioned the options of deactivating the collection and deleting
the data. One respondent wrote: “to alleviate privacy con-
cerns, it should be possible to opt out of, or ‘not agree’ to
certain terms.” Another wrote: “allow users to access to a
summary of all the data stored on their behalf, and allow
them to delete all or part of it if they desire.” The respon-
dents also highlighted that this should be simple and easy
to do and embedded on the user interface at the data level.
Certification from independent trusted organizations:
14 respondents suggested introducing a privacy certification
mechanism by independent trusted authorities. A few also
suggested the continuous conduction of privacy audits sim-
ilar to other fields such as safety and banking. Respon-
dents also suggested that the results of the checks and audits
should be made public to increase the pressure on software
vendors. One respondent even suggested “having a privacy
police to check on how data is handled.”
Transparency and risk communication, open source:
13 respondents mentioned increased transparency about the
collection, aggregation, and sharing of the data. In par-
ticular, respondents mentioned that the risks of misusing
the data should be also communicated clearly and contin-
uously. Three respondents suggested that making the code
open source would be the best approach for transparency.
One wrote: “tell users (maybe in the side-bar) how they are
being tracked. This would educate the general public and
ideally enable them to take control of their own data.” The
spectrum of transparency was from the data being collected
to physical safety measures of servers and qualifications of
people handling data to how long the data is stored.
Period and amount of data: 11 respondents recommended
always limiting and minimizing the amount of data and the
period of storage, referring to the principle of minimality.
The period of time for storing the data seems to be crucial
for users. One wrote: “Not allowing users data being stored
in servers. Just maintaining them in the source.”
Security and Encryption: We noted that respondents
strongly relate privacy issues to information security. At
least seven suggested security measures, mainly complete
encryption of data and communication channels.
Trust and Education: Seven respondents mentioned build-
ing trust in the system and vendor as well as education of
users on privacy as effective means to reduce privacy con-
cerns.
Short, usable, precise and understandable descrip-
tion, in the UI: At least six respondents mentioned increas-
ing the usability to access data and policy as an important
measure to reduce privacy concerns. One wrote: “the dis-
claimer should be directly accessible from the user interface
when conducting a function which needs my data.” Another
respondent wrote: “short understandable description and no
long complicated legal text.”
3.3 What types of data are critical?
To get a deeper insight into the privacy criticality of differ-
ent types of data, we asked respondents to rate the following
types of data on a 5-point semantic scale ranging from “Very
critical” to “Uncritical.”
• Content of documents (such as email body)
• Metadata (such as date)
• Interaction (such as a mouse click to open or send an
email)
• User location (such as the city from where the email
was sent)
• Name or personal data (such as email address)
• User preferences (such as inbox or email settings)
The results are shown in Figure 2. Respondents chose
content as most critical, followed by personal data, location,
preferences, and interaction and metadata are the least crit-
ical as far as privacy is concerned.
We used Welch’s Two Sample t-test to compare if the
difference among the different types of data is statistically
significant. The null hypothesis was that the difference in
means was equal to zero. The results are summarized in
Table 3. The results show, for example, that there is no sta-
tistically significant difference between content and personal
data. On the other hand, there is a statistically significant
difference between content and location for p < 0.01.
Hypothesis 3: People are more concerned about content
and personal data than interaction and metadata.
3.4 Would one give up privacy?
We asked respondents if they would accept less privacy
for the following:
• Monetary discounts (e.g., 10% discount on the next
purchase)
• “Intelligent” or added functionality of the system (such
as the Amazon recommendations)
• Fewer advertisements
For each option, the respondents could answer using a
3-point Semantic scale having options: “Yes,” “Uncertain,”
and “No.” The results are shown in Figure 3.
36.7% of the respondents said they would accept less pri-
vacy for added functionality of the system while only 20.7%
and 13.7% would accept less privacy for monetary discounts
and fewer advertisements respectively. Added functionality
seems to be the most important reason to accept less pri-
vacy. These results are statistically significant using the Z-
test for equality of proportions (p < 3.882e−5 for monetary
discounts and p < 1.854e−9 for fewer advertisements).
Even though these results are statistically significant, it
is important to note that less than half of the respondents
would accept less privacy for added functionality of the sys-
tem.
Previous studies, such as the one conducted by Acquisti et
al. [1], have showed, however, that people’s economic valua-
tions of privacy vary significantly and that people do accept
less privacy for monetary discounts. This contrast in results
might be due to a difference between people’s opinion and
their actual behavior.
Hypothesis 4: People say that they are not inclined to
give up privacy for additional benefits.
4. PERCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPERS
The results from the previous section describe the broad
concerns for the respondents of our study overall. Here, we
show the important results of doing a differential analysis for
respondents who are developers (267 out of 408 respondents)
versus users of software systems.
4.1 Privacy Concerns
Data distortion: 49.1% of developers believe that data
distortion is an important privacy concern. The percent-
age of users, on the other hand, is 64.5%. The difference
between these two groups is statistically significant (p =
0.003). (Note: We used the Z-test for equality of propor-
tions for the rest of this section, unless otherwise noted.)
Data aggregation: 52.1% of developers believe that data
aggregation is an important privacy concern. The percent-
age of users, on the other hand, is 63.1%. The difference
between them is statistically significant (p = 0.04185). It
seems that developers trust their systems more than users
when it comes to wrong interpretation of sensitive data.
Data criticality: Developers believe that “name and per-
sonal data” (p = 0.038) and “interaction” (p = 0.082) are
more critical for privacy compared to users. On the other
hand, for the remaining four categories (content, location,
preferences, metadata), there is no statistically significant
difference between the perceptions of developers and users
(p > 0.2 for all). We used Welch’s Two Sample t-test here.
Less privacy for added functionality: A larger fraction
of developers (43.3%) would accept less privacy for added or
intelligent functionality of the system compared to 31.2% of
users (p = 0.002).
Hypothesis 5: Developers are more concerned about in-
teraction, name, and personal data whereas users are more
concerned about data distortion and data aggregation.
4.2 Measures to Reduce Concerns
Developers and reducing concerns: A larger fraction
of developers feel that data anonymization (71.2%) is a bet-
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Figure 2: How critical would you rate the collection of the following data?
Content Personal Data Location Preferences Interaction Metadata
Content –
Personal Data –
Location + + –
Preferences +++ ++ + –
Interaction +++ +++ ++ + –
Metadata +++ +++ +++ ++ + –
Table 3: How significant is the difference in data criticality? (p-values: 0 ‘+ + +’ e−11 ‘++’ e−6 ‘+’ 0.01 ‘ ’ 1)
The rows and columns are ordered from most to least critical. For each cell, t-tests compare if the difference in criticality is
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Figure 3: Would users accept less privacy for the
following?
vacy policies or privacy laws (both, 56.9%) (p = 0.0006).
66.3% of developers prefer providing details on data usage
for mitigating privacy concerns compared to privacy policies
(56.9%) (p = 0.03).
Similarly, 20.2% of developers feel that privacy policies
will not reduce privacy concerns whereas only 11.2% feel
that providing details on data usage will not be beneficial
(p = 0.004).
Users and reducing concerns: In contrast, for users,
there is no statistically significant difference between their
perception on privacy policies, laws, anonymization, and
providing usage details. (0.6 < p < 1 for all combinations).
Hypothesis 6: Developers prefer anonymization and pro-
viding usage details as measures to reduce privacy concerns.
Users, on the other hand, do not have a strong preference.
5. THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHY
In this section, we present the results of the differen-
tial analysis based on the geography of respondents. We
asked respondents to specify with which region they iden-
tified themselves with. The options were North America,
South America, Europe, Asia/Pacific, Africa, and other.
Since we have only seven responses from South America
and Africa combined, we focus on the differences between
the others.
Data Criticality: For the different types of data that are
critical for privacy — content of documents, metadata, in-
teraction, user location, name or personal data, user prefer-
ences — respondents were asked to rate on a semantic scale
from 1-5 on how critical each data item was, with 1 being
“Very Critical” and 5 being “Uncritical.”
There is a statistically significant difference between re-
spondents from North America, Europe, and Asia/Pacific.
We used Welch’s Two Sample t-test to compare the ratings
given by respondents. Respondents in North America think
that all items are less critical (overall mean across the six
items, i.e., the mean of the means of the six types of data,
is 2.31) than respondents in Europe (overall mean: 1.87) for
p = 3.144e−8.
Similarly, respondents from North America think all items
are less critical that those in Asia/Pacific (overall mean:
2.01) for p = 0.037. On the other hand, there is no statis-
tically significant difference between respondents in Europe
and Asia/Pacific (p > 0.28).
Less privacy for added functionality: A larger fraction
of respondents in Europe (50.6%) would not give up privacy
for added functionality. In North America, on the other
hand, this fraction is 24.1%. The difference between the
two regions is statistically significant (p = 0.0001). (Note:
We used the Z-test for equality of proportions for the rest
of this section, unless otherwise noted.)
Hypothesis 7: People from North America are more will-
ing to give up privacy and feel that different types of data
are less critical for privacy compared to people from Europe.
Concerns about data sharing versus data distortion:
A larger fraction of respondents in North America (88.9%)
feel that data sharing is a concern compared to 46.3% for
data distortion (p = 6.093e−6). On the other hand, there is
no statistically significant difference among respondents in
Asia/Pacific (p > 0.67).
Concerns about data sharing versus data breach: In
Europe, a larger fraction of the respondents (94.3%) are
concerned about data breaches as compared to 76.4% for
data sharing. The difference is statistically significant (p =
5.435e−6). On the other hand, there is no statistically signif-
icant difference among respondents in North America (p >
0.12).
Laws versus usage details: In Europe, a larger fraction
of respondents (75.9%) feel that providing details on how
the data is being used will reduce privacy concerns as op-
posed to 58.1% who feel that privacy laws will be effective
(p = 0.00063). On the other hand, there is no statistically
significant difference among respondents in North America,
where the percentage of respondents are 67.9% and 64.2%
respectively (p > 0.43).
Usage details versus privacy policies: A larger frac-
tion of respondents in Europe (75.9%) feel that providing
usage details can mitigate concerns compared to 63.2% for
privacy policy (p = 0.015). On the other hand, there is
no statistically significant difference among respondents in
North America (p > 0.32).
Hypothesis 8: People from Europe feel that providing
usage details can be more effective for mitigating privacy
concerns than privacy laws and privacy policies whereas peo-
ple from North America feel that these three options are
equally effective.
6. DISCUSSION
We discuss our results, potential reasons, and the impli-
cations for software developers and analysts. We also reflect
on the limitations and threats to validity of our results.
6.1 Privacy Communication Gap
Our results from Sections 4 and 5 show there is a defi-
nite gap in privacy expectations and needs between users
and developers and between people from different regions
of the world. Developers have assumptions about privacy,
which do not always correspond to what users need. Devel-
opers seem to be less concerned about data distortion and
aggregation compared to users. It seems that developers
trust their systems more than users when it comes to wrong
interpretation of privacy critical data. Unlike users, devel-
opers prefer anonymization and providing usage details for
mitigating privacy concerns. If the expectations and needs
of users do not match those of developers, developers might
have wrong assumptions and might end up making wrong
decisions when designing and building software systems.
In addition, privacy is not a universal requirement as it
appears to have an internationalization aspect to it. Differ-
ent regions seem to have different concrete requirements and
understanding for privacy. Our results confirm that there
exist many cultural differences between various regions of
the world as far as privacy is concerned. The recent NSA
PRISM scandal has also brought these differences into sharp
focus. A majority of Americans considered NSA’s accessing
personal data to prevent terrorist threats more important
that privacy concerns [13]. In contrast, there was widespread
“outrage” in Europe over these incidents [15]. It also led to
an article in the New York Times by Malte Spitz, a member
of the German Green Party’s executive committee, titled
“Germans Loved Obama. Now We Don’t Trust Him.” [31].
These differences, both in terms of laws and people’s per-
ceptions, should be considered carefully when designing and
deploying software systems.
Data privacy is often an implicit requirement: everyone
talks about it but no one specifies what it means and how it
should be implemented. This topic also attracts the inter-
ests of different stakeholders including users, lawyers, sales
people, and security experts, which makes it even harder to
define and implement. One important result from our study
is that while almost all respondents agree about the im-
portance of privacy, the understanding of the privacy issues
and the measures to reduce privacy concerns are divergent.
This calls for an even more careful and distinguished anal-
ysis of privacy when designing and building a system. We
think that privacy should become an explicit requirement,
with measurable and testable criteria. We also think that
privacy should also become a main design criteria for de-
velopers as software systems are collecting more and more
data about their users [14]. To this end, we feel that there
is a need to develop a standard survey for privacy that soft-
ware teams can customize and reuse for their projects and
users. Our survey can be reused to conduct additional user
studies on privacy for specific systems. Our results can also
serve as a benchmark for comparing the data. This can help
build a body of knowledge and provide guidelines such as
best practices.
6.2 The Security Dimension of Privacy
We think that people are more concerned about data breaches
and data sharing as there have been many recent instances
that have gotten a lot of news and media coverage. To list
a few recent examples, Sony suffered a massive data breach
in its Playstation network that led to the theft of personal
information belonging to 77 million users [6]. 160 million
credit card numbers were stolen and sold from various com-
panies including Citibank, the Nasdaq stock exchange, and
Carrefour [29]. The Federal Trade Commission publicly lent
support to the “Do-Not-Track” system for advertising [4].
Compared to these high-profile stories, we feel that there
have been relatively few “famous” instances of privacy prob-
lems caused by data aggregation or data distortion yet.
There is a large body of research that has advanced the
state-of-the-art in security (encryption) and authorization.
One short-term implication for engineers and managers is to
systematically implement security solutions when designing
and deploying systems that collect user data, even if it is not
a commercially or politically sensitive system. This would
significantly and immediately reduce privacy concerns. For
the medium-term, more research should be conducted for
deployable data aggregation and data distortion solutions.
As far as mitigating privacy concerns, our results show
that there is more disagreement. We believe that the reason
for this is because online privacy concerns are a relatively
recent phenomenon. Due to this, people are not sure which
approach works best and might be beneficial in the long run.
6.3 Privacy Framework
The long-term goal of this study is to develop a universal,
empirically grounded framework for implementing privacy
requirements. Some of the lessons learned from our study
can be translated into concrete qualities and features, which
should be part of such a framework. This includes:
• Anonymization: This is perhaps the most well-known
privacy mitigating technique and seems to be perceived
as an important and effective measure by both users
and developers. Developers should therefore use anony-
mization algorithms and libraries.
• Default encryption: As users are mainly concerned
about the loss and abuse of their data, systems col-
lecting user data should implement and activate en-
cryption mechanism for storing and transmitting these
data. In Facebook, e.g., the default standard commu-
nication protocol should be HTTPS and not HTTP.
• Fine-grained control over the data: Users become less
concerned about privacy if the system provides a mech-
anism to control their data. This includes activating
and deactivating the collection at any time, the possi-
bility to access and delete the raw data and processed
data, and define who should have access to what data.
• Interaction data first: Users have a clear preference
of the criticality of the different types of data col-
lected about them. Therefore, software researchers
and designers should first try to implement their sys-
tems based on collecting and mining interaction data
instead of content of files and documents. Research has
advanced a lot in this field in, especially, recommender
systems.
• Time and space-limited storage: The storage of data
about users should be limited in time and space. The
location where the data is stored is an important fac-
tor for many respondents. Therefore, systems should
provide options to choose the location to store privacy
sensitive data.
• Privacy policies, laws, and usage details: Users rated
all these options as equally effective for mitigating pri-
vacy concerns. Therefore, developers could utilize any
of these options, thus giving them better flexibility in
the design and deployment of software systems.
6.4 Limitations and Threats to Validity
There are several limitations to our study, which we now
discuss. The first limitation is selection bias — respondents
who volunteered to fill out our survey were self-selected.
Such selection bias implies that our results are only applica-
ble to the volunteering population and may not necessarily
generalize to other populations. The summaries have helped
us identify certain trends and hypotheses and these should
be validated and tested by representative samples, e.g., for
certain countries. In contrast, the pseudo-experiment con-
ducted within our set of respondents, enabled us to iden-
tify statistically significant relationships and correlations.
Hence, many of our results deliberately focus on correlations
and cross-tabulations between different populations.
As for internal validity, we are aware that by filling out
a brief survey, we can only understand a limited amount
of concerns that the respondents have in mind. Similarly,
the format and questions of the survey might constrain the
expressiveness of some of the respondents. We might have
missed certain privacy concerns and techniques to reduce
concerns by the design of the survey. We tried to mitigate
this by providing a few open-ended questions that respon-
dents could use to tell us additional things they had in mind.
As with any online survey, there is a possibility that re-
spondents did not fully understand the question or chose the
response options arbitrarily. We also conducted several pilot
tests, gave the option to input comments, and the incomple-
tion rate is relatively small. We included a few validation
questions and we only report responses in this paper from re-
spondents who answered these questions correctly. We also
provided two versions of the survey, in English and German,
to make it easier for non-native speakers.
In spite of these limitations, we managed to get a large
and diverse population that filled out our survey. This gives
us confidence about the overall trends reported in this paper.
7. RELATEDWORK
There has been a lot of research in privacy and security in
different research communities. We highlight the important
related work in this section.
Many recent studies on online social networks show that
there is a (typically, large) discrepancy between users’ in-
tentions for what their privacy settings should be versus
what they actually are. For example, Madejski et al. re-
port that, in their study on Facebook, 94% of their partic-
ipants (n = 65) were sharing something they intended to
hide and 85% were hiding something that they intended to
share [23,24]. Liu et al. [23] found that Facebook’s users’ pri-
vacy settings match their expectations only 37% of the time.
A recent longitudinal study by Stutzman et al. [34] shows
how privacy settings for users on Facebook have evolved
over a period of time. These studies have focused on pri-
vacy settings in a specific online system whereas our study
was designed to be agnostic to any particular online systems.
Further, the main contribution of these studies is to show
that there is a discrepancy between what the settings are
and what they should be and how settings evolve over time.
Our study aims to gain a deeper understanding of what the
requirements are and how they change across geography and
software development experience.
Fang and LeFevre [17] proposed an automated technique
for configuring a user’s privacy settings in online social net-
working sites. Paul et al. [27] present using a color coding
scheme for making privacy settings more usable. Squiccia-
rini, Shehab, and Paci [33] propose a game-theoretic ap-
proach for collaborative sharing and control of images in a
social network. Toubiana et al. [37] present a system that au-
tomatically applies users’ privacy settings for photo tagging.
All these papers propose new techniques that are targeted
to making privacy settings “better” (i.e., more usable, more
visible) from a user’s perspective. Our results help devel-
opment teams decide when and which of these techniques
should be implemented. We focus more on a broader re-
quirements and engineering perspective of privacy than on
a specific technical perspective.
There has been a lot of recent work on the economic ram-
ifications of privacy. For example, Acquisti et al. [1] (and
the references therein) conducted a number of field and on-
line experiments to investigate the economic valuations of
privacy. In Section 3.4, we discussed whether users would
give up privacy for additional benefits like discounts or fewer
advertisements. Our study complements and contrasts the
work of Acquisti et al. as described earlier.
There has also been a lot of work related to data anony-
mization and building accurate data models for statistical
use (e.g., [2, 16, 22, 28, 39]). These techniques aim to pre-
serve certain properties of the data (e.g., statistical prop-
erties like average) so they can be useful in data mining
while trying to preserve privacy of individual records. Simi-
lar to these, there has also been work on anonymizing social
networks [8] and anonymizing user profiles for personalized
web search [41]. The broad approaches include aggregating
data to a higher level of granularity or adding noise and ran-
dom perturbations. There has been research on breaking the
anonymity of data as well. Narayanan and Shmatikov [26]
show how it is possible to correlate public IMDb data with
private anonymized Netflix movie rating data resulting in
the potential identification of the anonymized individuals.
Backstrom et al. [5] and Wondracek et al. [40] describe a
series of attacks for de-anonymizing social networks.
In the Software Engineering community, there have been
recent papers on privacy, which mainly focus on data anony-
mization techniques. Clause and Orso [12] propose tech-
niques for the automated anonymization of field data for
software testing. They extend the work done by Castro et
al. [11] using novel concepts of path condition relaxation
and breakable input conditions resulting in improving the
effectiveness of input anonymization. Taneja et al. [36] and
Grechanik et al. [19] propose using k-anonymity [35] for
privacy by selectively anonymizing certain attributes of a
database for software testing. They propose novel approaches
using static analysis for selecting which attributes to anonymize
so that test coverage remains high. Our work complements
these existing papers as respondents in our study considered
anonymization an effective technique for mitigating privacy
concerns. Thus, these techniques could be used as part of a
privacy framework. There have also been some recent papers
on extracting privacy requirements from privacy regulations
and laws [9, 10]. These could be part of the privacy frame-
work as well and help in reducing the impact due to cultural
differences for privacy.
Finally, many authors of papers in the software engineer-
ing and requirements engineering communities mention pri-
vacy in their discussion or challenges section. But in many
cases, there is little evidence and grounded theory about
what, how, and in which context privacy concerns exist and
what the best measures for addressing them are. Our study
helps in clarifying these concerns and measures and compar-
ing the different perceptions of people.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted a study to explore the privacy
requirements for users and developers in online systems, such
as Amazon and Facebook, that collect and store data about
the user. Our study consisted of 408 valid responses repre-
senting a broad spectrum of respondents: people with and
without software development experience and people from
North America, Europe, and Asia. While the broad major-
ity of respondents (more than 91%) agreed about the im-
portance of privacy as a main issue for modern software
systems, there was disagreement concerning the concrete
importance of different privacy concerns and the measures
to address them. The biggest concerns about privacy were
data breaches and data sharing. Users were more concerned
about data aggregation and data distortion than developers.
As far as mitigating privacy concerns, there was little con-
sensus on the best technique among users. In terms of data
criticality, respondents rated content of documents as most
critical and metadata as least critical.
We also compared if there was any difference in privacy
perceptions based on geographic location of the respondent.
We observed many differences in our study. Respondents
from North America, for example, consider all types of data
as less critical for privacy than respondents from Europe or
Asia/Pacific. Respondents from Europe are more concerned
about data breaches than data sharing whereas respondents
from North America are equally concerned about the two.
Finally, we gave some insight into a framework and a set of
guidelines on privacy requirements for developers when de-
signing and building software systems. Our results can help
establish such a framework, which can be a catalog of pri-
vacy concerns and measures, a questionnaire to assess them,
and perhaps a library of reusable privacy functionality.
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